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Putting social rewards and identity
salience to the test: Evidence from a
field experiment with teachers in Philadelphia

Syon P. Bhanot*‡, Gordon Kraft-Todd†‡, David Rand†‡, Erez Yoeli‡
Abstract: We partnered with the School District of Philadelphia (SDP) to run a randomized experiment testing
interventions to increase teacher participation in an annual feedback survey, an uncompensated task that requires a teacher’s time but helps the educational system overall. Our experiment varied the nature of the incentive scheme used, and the associated messaging. In the experiment, all 8,062 active teachers in the SDP
were randomly assigned to receive one of four emails using a 2x2 experimental design; specifically, teachers
received a lottery-based financial incentive to complete the survey that was either "personal" (a chance to win
one of fifteen $100 gift cards for themselves) or "social" (a chance to win one of fifteen $100 gift cards for
supplies for their students), and also received email messaging that either did or did not make salient their
identity as an educator. Despite abundant statistical power, we find no discernible differences across our conditions on survey completion rates. One implication of these null results is that from a public administration
perspective, social rewards may be preferable since funds used for this purpose by school districts go directly
to students (through increased expenditure on student supplies), and do not seem less efficacious than personal financial incentives for teachers.
Keywords: Behavioral policy, Identity, Social Incentives, Field experiment, Education

A

cademic researchers in economics and psychology have increasingly explored the use
of light-touch behavioral interventions to influence
individual behavior. These efforts have led to the
development of a number of tools to address the
many barriers to behavior change, including framing manipulations in messaging (Kahneman &
Tversky, 1981), harnessing social incentives (Bandiera et al., 2010, Ashraf et al., 2014, Kraft-Todd et
al., 2015, Bursztyn & Jensen, 2015), and making
personal identities salient (Steele & Aronson, 1990,
Spencer & Castano, 2007, Carr & Steele, 2010, Benjamin et al., 2010, Cohn et al., 2015, Benjamin et al.,
2016, Kessler & Milkman, 2016). However, while
behavioral interventions have shown significant
promise, the body of evidence supporting their applicability across a variety of real-world contexts remains relatively thin.

In the policy domain, behavioral interventions have increasingly been considered as tools to
promote contributions to public goods specifically.
This is often motivated by the mixed evidence on
the efficacy of (small) financial incentives in field
experiments (Kraft-Todd et al., 2015). Furthermore, even when they are effective, small financial
incentives at the individual level can aggregate together to be quite costly when utilized at scale.
Thus, if the expected impacts of financial incentives are modest, and the expected costs non-trivial,
the cost effectiveness of financial incentives can be
very low. This reality has encouraged academics
and policymakers to consider utilizing social incentives for behavior change, with the argument that
they can be cost effective tools for addressing policy challenges (Allcott, 2011, Ashraf et al., 2014,
Hallsworth et al., 2017). Recent research suggests
that social incentives can be particularly efficacious
in the context of prosocial behavior (for a review,
see Kraft-Todd et al., 2015, who discuss the inconsistent evidence supporting the use of financial incentives to promote prosocial behavior, contrasting
it with the more promising impacts of social motivators in this area).
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One alternative approach would be to offer monetary “social rewards” rather than personal
rewards as an incentive for certain behaviors (Anik
et al., 2013). An example of this might be offering
someone a $50 donation in their name to charity in
exchange for doing a certain behavior, instead of
$50 in cash for that behavior. This approach offers
a number of benefits. First, it leverages individuals’
prosocial motivations and avoids some of the potential pitfalls of financial incentives, particularly in
the domain of prosocial behaviors. For example,
one might worry that personal financial incentives
for collectively-beneficial behavior might “crowd
out” intrinsic motivation (Gneezy & Rustichini,
2000). Second, social rewards might be preferable
from the perspective of the policymaker, even if
they are not more efficacious than personal incentives, because money used for social rewards can
improve social welfare more directly than money
spent on private rewards. This is especially true
when the social reward is something like a charitable contribution or increased funding for public
goods.
Another form of behavioral intervention
that is increasingly common in the literature is the
use of identity salience manipulations as a way to
change behavior. This research suggests that making a specific “identity” salient at the moment of
decision making might encourage individuals to
conform to that identity by engaging in the behaviors associated with it (Benjamin et al., 2010, Cohn
et al., 2015, Benjamin et al., 2016, Kessler & Milkman, 2016). By this logic, when seeking to encourage prosocial decisions, it might be effective to
make an identity that is aligned with prosocial
choices more salient before asking for prosocial action. For example, in Kessler and Milkman (2016),
the authors test the impact of making a “giving
identity” salient in a charitable donation solicitation
by reminding treatment subjects of their previous
donations. They find that this manipulation significantly increased giving rates, suggesting that reminders of one’s identity might have tangible impacts on prosociality. Furthermore, evidence suggests that identity salience interventions, in addition
to being efficacious on their own, may be useful in
enhancing other behavioral interventions, especially ones intended to enhance prosociality. Consistent with this, many Get Out the Vote Letters
begin with an identity salience manipulation such as,
“You are a voter!” (Bryan et al., 2011).

In this article, we describe an intervention
involving an email campaign designed to test the
impact of social versus personal rewards and an
identity salience manipulation on prosocial behavior change amongst school teachers—namely, encouraging teachers to complete a 30-minute annual
survey that benefits the school district by providing
information that helps improve the educational system. All 8,062 teachers1 in the School District of
Philadelphia (SDP) were included in the study sample. Our randomized design allows us to compare
the impact of a monetary reward implemented in
the form of supplies for teachers’ students (social)
versus money for the teacher (personal). Furthermore, we test whether or not making a teacher’s
professional identity as an educator more salient influences response rates, and how this identity salience manipulation might interact with the efficacy
of social versus personal rewards. Our article contributes to the growing body of literature using randomized evaluations to learn more about how actors in the educational system make decisions and
how behavioral manipulations can shape educational outcomes (Fryer et al., 2012, Kraft & Rogers,
2015, Gehlbach et al., 2016, Levitt et al., 2016). Furthermore, our results speak to literature in public
administration on the motivations underlying public service, and how interventions based on behavioral science might be more effective than pay-forperformance when it comes to motivating public
sector employees (Ritz et al., 2016, Grant, 2008).
There are useful implications of our specific manipulations for the management of public
education systems. First, if identity salience manipulations motivate teachers to act prosocially, such
techniques would be useful levers for school districts looking to motivate teacher behavior change.
Second, if social rewards are (at least) as impactful
as personal financial rewards in motivating teachers
to take prosocial actions, it would support the substitution of social rewards in place of personal rewards for teachers where the latter currently exist,
as social rewards arguably better serve the educational aims of school districts given that the money
expended on these rewards often go directly to the
students.
Contrary to our expectations, our main
findings are null results: social and personal rewards
had roughly the same impact on survey completion,
and identity salience had no meaningful effect on
survey completion. Taking advantage of this large
2
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dataset, we also conduct non-experimental, exploratory analyses to determine which school characteristics predict survey completion, in order to detect
potential moderator variables for our treatments.
We find that teachers at schools with higher parent
and student satisfaction and with higher teacher ratings are more likely to complete these surveys,
while teachers at schools where students have
fewer behavioral issues (e.g. lower suspension rates
and higher attendance rates) are less likely to complete these surveys.
Based on these exploratory results, we
conduct additional analyses of our treatment effects
that provide some potentially useful (although far
from definitive) insights. We find some evidence
that the identity salience manipulation actually lowered survey completion rates at schools with relatively lower-rated teachers (which was determined
using an SDP metric on teacher effectiveness),
while having a more positive effect on survey completion rates at schools with highly-rated teachers
(determined using the same SDP metric). These
findings suggest that identity manipulations like
ours may be better suited for use at schools with
better teachers. Finally, we find minimal evidence
of an interaction between our identity salience manipulation and past survey completion by teachers.
That is, the point estimate is positive, but also very
small, suggesting that our identity manipulation did
not trigger a meaningful “consistency” motivation
(Gneezy et al., 2012, Freedman & Fraser, 1966,
Mullen & Monin, 2016) for teachers who completed the survey last year.
Taken together, these results suggest that
the identity manipulation we designed may not be
of practical use outside of higher quality schools,
but that social rewards may be preferable to personal rewards as a tool to motivate teachers. That
is, while both reward types motivated teachers
equally well, social rewards directly increase student
welfare more than personal rewards. More broadly,
our findings suggest that while the use of behavioral interventions in public administration shows
promise, there is room for further testing and development of effective, scalable interventions that
motivate public sector employees (Ritz, et al., 2016).

we present here. First, we developed the intervention directly with the School District of Philadelphia (SDP), who served as the implementing partner. Second, we received institutional support from
the Philadelphia Mayor’s Office, through GovPHL
and the Philadelphia Behavioral Science Initiative
(www.phillybsi.org), a broader effort to integrate
behavioral science into public policy through collaborations between academic researchers and city
policymakers.

Subjects, Context, and Design

The study’s sample was the full population of
teachers employed by the School District of Philadelphia—a total of 8,062 teachers. Every spring,
Philadelphia teachers receive an email from the
school district with a link to an “end-of-year survey,” designed to elicit their feedback about various
issues affecting schools. This survey is one of the
primary channels through which the school district
learns about what is happening in schools across
the city. Therefore, increasing engagement with this
survey is a key policy priority for the city. From an
academic perspective, completing the survey can be
thought of as a “cooperative” behavior on the part
of the teacher; that is, it involves the teacher bearing a personal time-and-effort cost to generate a
collective benefit. Our intervention involved the integration of a randomized experiment into the
standard annual procedure of sending emails to
teachers about the survey, namely through manipulations of the messaging content of the email and
the rewards used to motivate survey completion.
We randomly assigned teachers to one of
four treatment groups,2 with each group receiving
a different type of email (and three ensuing email
reminders with consistent messaging). Our intervention used a 2x2 factorial design, in which we
varied the type of reward used (“personal” vs. “social”) and whether or not a “teacher identity” was
made salient in the language in the email.
The experimental conditions are shown in
Table 1. Subjects in the personal rewards conditions were offered the chance to win one of fifteen
$100 Barnes and Noble gift cards for personal use,
while subjects in the social rewards treatment were
offered the chance to win one of fifteen $100 Office Depot gift cards to purchase school supplies
for their students. To distinguish between treatment groups, subjects who received the personal
reward and no identity manipulation will hereafter
be called the “Standard” group, those who received

Experiment Design
Implementing Partners

We worked with two institutional partners to plan,
design, and implement the randomized experiment
3
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Table 1
Experimental conditions (2x2 design)
Personal
Financial Incentive

Social
Financial Incentive

Standard
Email Language

“Standard”
(2,025 subjects)

“Social Rewards Only”
(1,999 subjects)

Identity Salience
Email Language

“Identity Only”
(2,010 subjects)

“Social Rewards + Identity”
(2,028 subjects)

the social reward and no identity manipulation will
be called the “Social Rewards Only” group, those
who received the personal reward and the teacher
identity manipulation will be called the “Identity
Only” group, and those who received both the social reward and identity manipulation will be called
the “Social Rewards + Identity” group.
Note that there was no pure “control”
group that did not receive emails (or incentives of
some form) as part of the intervention. The reason
for this was two-fold. First, the SDP did not want
to offer some teachers a financial reward to complete the survey and not offer other teachers a similar financial reward (though variation in the nature
of the reward was deemed acceptable). Second,
from an experimental design perspective there was
a concern about spillover effects (through word of
mouth) if we had a control group with no incentives. Also note that the emails sent to teachers included instructions to take the survey through an
employee portal. Copies of the exact emails sent are
included in the Appendix.
The initial treatment emails were sent on
April 4, 2017, with the follow up reminder emails
sent on April 25, May 11, and May 25. The outcome
variable we measured was survey response for
teachers at the individual level. There are no measurement concerns with this metric, because it came
directly from reliable administrative data and represents an explicit measurement of the policy objective from the perspective of the SDP.

comparisons both without and with a Bonferroni
correction for the three comparisons to determine
the minimum detectable effects (MDEs) from our
intervention. Based on conversations with the
SDP, an effect size of roughly five percentage
points was agreed upon as being practically significant for policy and therefore formed the basis of
our assessment of MDEs. Note that using the Bonferroni correction of the p-value is widely regarded
as providing very conservative estimates of power
(Anderson, 2008).
We used data from the 2015 and 2016
teacher surveys to come up with an ex-ante expected completion rate for the survey in 2017. Specifically, 54% of SDP teachers completed the survey in 2016 and 57% completed the survey in 2015,
so we used an estimate of 54% for our power calculations. The results are presented in Table 2. The
MDEs were close to our five percentage point target for practical significance for the SDP.

Power and Minimum Detectable Effects

Notes: This table shows the minimum detectable
effects (MDEs) in percentage points, assuming
power of 80 percent, when the full sample of
8,062 teachers is considered and when only 4,031
are considered (half the sample, for analysis of
treatment effects, within a given condition, of the
other condition).

Table 2
Minimum detectable effects
MDE (Percentage Points)

Our 2x2 research design was structured to test 3
different comparisons (social vs. financial rewards,
overall; teacher identity salience vs. no identity salience, overall; and the interaction of social rewards
and teacher identity salience). Given that the sample size in our study was fixed, we conducted an exante power analysis for each of these three pairwise
4

Sample Size

Without
Bonferroni

With
Bonferroni

8062

0.0310

0.0358

4031

0.0438

0.0505
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found that teachers from higher-quality schools
(i.e., schools with more highly-rated teachers and
higher parent/student satisfaction in SDP performance metrics), were more likely to complete the
survey in general, we hypothesized that both the
social rewards and identity salience manipulations
would be more impactful for teachers from these
schools. The logic for this was that our manipulations would have a greater impact on teachers with
more prosocial preferences and/or a stronger commitment to their careers as educators, relative to
other teachers. We are able to provide suggestive
evidence for this hypothesis.

Randomization

The method used in this intervention was a simple
randomization carried out by the researchers using
Stata and transferred into Excel. The randomization was carried out at the individual teacher level
and then shared with the SDP for implementation.

Data Collection and IRB Issues

All required data is regularly collected by the SDP.
We obtained IRB approval from the Swarthmore
College IRB to receive the data from the school district and conduct the data analysis.
We received anonymized administrative
data at the teacher-level from the SDP on survey
completion, along with treatment assignment and
some basic information about each teacher
(namely, whether they taught in the SDP in the academic year prior, whether they completed the survey in the academic year prior, and what school
they taught in). We also used public data on school
performance metrics and characteristics from the
SDP Open Data Initiative3 to gather details at the
school level, which we merged with the teacherlevel data to supplement our analysis.

Analytical Approach

In order to assess the success of the intervention,
we use simple linear probability model regressions
(OLS regressions with a binary outcome). We also
provide results from logit models in the Online
Supplement, for robustness. Because of randomization, and the very limited data available at the
teacher level based on the data sharing agreement
with the SDP, the specifications are quite straightforward, and are as follows:

Hypotheses

Our hypotheses are based on the large body of literature on the efficacy of identity salience manipulations and personal versus social incentives, drawing from both rational and behavioral models of
decision making. We had three primary hypotheses.
First, we hypothesized that the social rewards treatment would outperform the personal rewards (in
line with Kraft-Todd et al., 2015). Note that a
model that assumes pure self-interest would predict
the opposite (namely that personal financial incentives would outperform social incentives). Second,
we hypothesized that the identity salience manipulation would increase prosocial behavior, in the
form of survey response by teachers (Kessler &
Milkman, 2016). Third, we hypothesized that the
identity salience manipulation would amplify the
effectiveness of social rewards versus personal rewards. We also had one secondary hypothesis exante, namely that the identity salience manipulation
would have a greater impact on individuals who
completed the survey in 2016, as it serves to reinforce the importance of behavioral consistency
(Gneezy et al., 2012).
We also developed one ex-post hypothesis
based on exploratory data analysis around the predictors of survey completion. Specifically, having
5

yi = β0 + β1 · SocialRewardsi
+ β2 · 2016Completioni
+ β3 · 2016Ineligiblei + γ + ε

(1)

yi = β0 + β1 · Identityi
+ β2 · 2016Completioni
+ β3 · 2016Ineligiblei + γ + ε

(2)

yi = β0 + β1 · IdentityOnlyi
+ β2 · SocialRewardOnlyi
+ β3 · (SocialRewards+Identity)i
+ β4 · 2016Completioni
+ β5 · 2016Ineligiblei + γ + ε

(3)

yi = β0 + β1 · Identityi
+ β2 · GoodTeachersi
+ β3 · (Identityi · GoodTeachersi)
+ β4 · 2016Completioni
+ β5 · 2016Ineligiblei + ε

(4)

yi = β0 + β1 · SocialRewardsi
+ β2 · GoodTeachersi
+ β3 · (SocialRewardsi · GoodTeachersi)
+ β4 · 2016Completioni
+ β5 · 2016Ineligiblei + ε

(5)
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yi = β0 + β1 · Identityi
+ β2 · 2016Completioni
+ β3 · (Identityi · 2016Completioni)
+ β4 · 2016Ineligiblei + γ + ε

might interact with intervention efficacy (one of
our secondary questions of interest).
Specifications 4-6 allow us to conduct exploratory analyses involving interactions between
the experimental conditions and two important
baseline variables. First, Specifications 4 and 5 interact the two main effects with a dummy variable
identifying teachers who work in schools with more
highly-rated teachers, a designation that we determined using a school-level metric on teacher effectiveness from the 2015-2016 SDP School Progress
Report (SPR). Specifically, we used the SPR measure that reported on the percentage of teachers at a
given school who received an effectiveness rating
of “distinguished,” and identified schools with high
teacher quality as those whose percentage of “distinguished” teachers was above the median. Second,
Specification 6 interacts the identity main effect
with a dummy variable for whether or not a teacher
completed the annual teacher survey in 2016, the
year prior to this experiment. This was done to determine if identity salience manipulations were
more impactful when they aligned with the idea of
“consistency” with past behavior (in this case, completing the survey last year).

(6)

Note that γ in specifications 1, 2, 3, and 6
refer to school fixed effects, while the variables
“2016Completion” and “2016Ineligible” together
constitute a control for survey completion behavior
of a given teacher in the previous year (teachers
could either have done the survey the previous year,
not done it the previous year when eligible, or not
been eligible to do it the previous year because they
did not work at the SDP at the time).
Specifications 1-3 are all simple measurements of average treatment effects, using OLS regressions. Specification 1 estimates the causal impact of social rewards as a main effect, with controls for last year’s survey completion behavior and
school fixed effects. Specification 2 does the same
but for the identity salience manipulation. Specification 3 includes all experimental conditions, and
therefore includes the interaction condition involving both manipulations. Note that we also run the
analysis from specifications 1 and 2 separately for
teachers from schools of various overall performance levels (or “tiers”), as reported publicly by the
SDP, to assess how measures of school quality

Results
Figure 1 and Table 3 present the results related to

Figure 1
Survey completion by condition (std. error marked)

Notes: The dotted lines indicate ±5pp from the Standard treatment mean, which we determined a priori to be the threshold for a meaningful effect.
6
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Table 3
Average treatment effects
Identity Manipulation

Identity

(1)
2017
Comp.
-0.00252
(0.0110)

Social Rewards
Manipulation
(3)
(4)
2017Comp.
2017
Comp.

(2)
2017
Comp.
-0.00203
(0.00943)

Social Rewards

-0.00777
(0.0110)

All Conditions
(5)
2017
Comp.

(6)
2017
Comp.

-0.00356
(0.0155)
-0.00885
(0.0155)
-0.0102
(0.0155)

-0.00108
(0.0135)
-0.00710
(0.0132)
-0.0100
(0.0132)

-0.00804
(0.00937)

Identity Only
Social Rewards Only
Social Rewards + Identity
Completed in 2016

0.208∗∗∗
(0.0113)

0.208∗∗∗
(0.0113)

0.208∗∗∗
(0.0113)

Ineligible in 2016

0.154∗∗∗
(0.0173)

0.154∗∗∗
(0.0173)

0.154∗∗∗
(0.0173)

Constant

0.585∗∗∗
0.731∗∗∗
0.587∗∗∗
0.734∗∗∗
0.589∗∗∗
0.734∗∗∗
(0.00777)
(0.0571)
(0.0078)
(0.0570)
(0.0109)
(0.0574)
Observations
8062
8062
8062
8062
8062
8062
0.000
0.327
0.000
0.327
0.000
0.327
𝑅2
School Fixed Effects
No
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
Notes: This table shows the main results from this experiment, in the form of average treatment effects, using linear
probability models. Specifications 1-2 show the average treatment effects of the Identity manipulation only, 3-4 show
those for the Social Rewards manipulation only, and 5-6 show all treatment conditions (with the condition involving
both manipulations), respectively. Regressions with and without controls are included–the controls are: 1) dummy
variables for survey completion and ineligibility for the survey (meaning not employed by SDP) in the previous year
(the omitted group being teachers eligible but not completing in the previous year); and 2) school fixed effects.

our main three hypotheses. As is apparent from
visual inspection of Figure 1, neither the social rewards treatment nor the identity salience manipulation increased survey completion—if anything,
they reduced it slightly. This is confirmed in the regression results in Table 3: in the specifications that
estimate main effects with controls (columns 2 and
4), the coefficients on the identity and social rewards treatments are -0.2 and -0.8 percentage
points, respectively. The results of all other specifications are quite similar. Likewise, the identity salience manipulation does not positively interact
with the social rewards treatment. If anything, the
interaction is slightly negative: the coefficient on

the interaction is roughly -1 percentage point (Table 3, columns 5 and 6).
To better understand how school characteristics predict survey completion, we next conduct non-experimental, exploratory analyses to detect potential moderator variables for our treatments. For this analysis, we use 21 school-level variables for which we had at least 7,000 teacher observations (representing 87% of our sample), and
two teacher-level variables capturing survey completion behavior in the previous year. In Table 4,
we present the results of these analyses. Column 1

7
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Table 4
Linear probability models

School-level
predictors

Teacher-level
predictors

Single LPM

Multiple
LPM

Stepwise
LPM

Climate Score (SPR)
% Students w Attendance>95%
Achievement Score (SPR)
% Students w/ Positive view of Teacher Quality
Climate Rating (Students)
Student Retention Rate
% Students Economically Disadvantaged
% Teacher Eﬀectiveness of Distinguished
Enrollment
Teacher Attendance Rate
% Teacher Observation of Distinguished
Climate Rating (Parents)
Parent Survey Participation
% Students in Special Education
% Students w/ Zero In-School Suspensions
Serious Incidents (per capita)
% Students w/ Zero Out-of-School Suspensions
% Students Female
% Students Black
Suspensions (per capita)
Progress Score (SPR)

-0.063***
-0.094***
-0.051***
0.057***
0.074***
-0.083***
-0.043***
0.046***
-0.098***
0.093***
0.034*
0.050***
0.082***
0.094***
0.003
0.050***
-0.061***

0.308***
-0.253***
-0.262***
0.197***
-0.188***
-0.153***
-0.128***
0.115***
-0.101***
0.085***
0.037
-0.057**
0.047*
-0.034
-0.030
-0.029
-0.018

0.300***
-0.244***
-0.238***
0.226***
-0.222***
-0.154***
-0.122***
0.097***
-0.094***
0.085***
0.045*

0.013
0.054***
0.064***
-0.042***

-0.015
0.010
-0.008
-0.002

Completed 2016 Survey (if eligible)
Completed 2016 Survey
Ineligible for 2016 Survey

0.246***
0.031

0.228***
0.116***

Unique
factor
loading >.5
1
1
1,3
2
2
1
3
3
3
2
2
1
1
1

1

0.228***
0.114***

Observations
>7129
7101
7101
R-squared
0.121
0.117
Notes: This table shows linear probability models of school-level variables predicting teacher survey completion using
single (Column 1), multiple (Column 2), and stepwise (Column 3) regression (using p<.00434 as removal criteria), as well
as factor analysis (Column 4). Predictors and dependent measures are standardized; listed coeﬃcients represent the change
in standard deviations of survey completion for each standard deviation change in the predictor variable. A Bonferroni
correction is used for 23 multiple comparisons and the variables are presented in the order of statistical significance.
*p<.00434, **p<.00217, ***p<.000434.

presents the standardized coefficients from individual single-variable regressions of survey completion on each of the 23 school- and teacher-level
predictors. Column 2 presents the standardized coefficients from a multivariable regression of survey
completion on all variables in column 1 at once.4
Column 3 presents the results of a stepwise regression of survey completion on the same variables,
ordered by the magnitude of the effect from column 1. We also explore the underlying structure of
the relationship between school characteristics and

survey completion using factor analysis with varimax (orthogonal) rotation. The analysis yielded
three factors explaining 83% of the variance in all
school characteristics. Column 4 presents the
unique factor loadings of each of the school-level
predictors when greater than 0.5. We see that the
three factors map, respectively, onto metrics associated with: (1) good student behavior (student attendance, retention, etc.); (2) parent/student satisfaction (student evaluations of teachers and school
climate, parent evaluations of school climate, etc.);
8
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and (3) quality teachers (teacher effectiveness ratings at the school level, etc.). Follow-up analyses
find that good student behavior negatively predicts
survey completion, whereas the other two factors
positively predict survey completion. 5 See Figure 1
in the Online Supplement for details.
We use these exploratory results to guide
an investigation into whether our treatments had
stronger effects for certain subpopulations. Specifically, given that a teacher having completed the
survey in the previous year and various school
quality measures were important predictors of survey completion, we form a secondary hypothesis
that our manipulations would have larger effects at
schools with more highly-rated teachers and better
overall performance metrics. The motivating idea

here is that our treatments might work better when
teachers feel a stronger sense of prosocial commitment to their students, which may be more likely
with better teachers or at better schools.
Table 5 presents one test for this hypothesis, using interaction effects between teacher quality at the school level and our manipulations to determine if there was a larger impact from the manipulations at schools with more highly-rated
teachers. To measure teacher quality here, we use a
dummy variable marking schools as having “high
quality” teachers if the percentage of teachers at
that school receiving a “distinguished” evaluation
in teacher effectiveness (an SPR measure) was
above the median in Philadelphia. Note that we do

Table 5
Interaction effects

Identity x High Teach. Qual. School

High Teach. Qual. School x
Treatments
(1)
(2)
2017 Comp.
2017 Comp.
0.050**
(0.022)

Social Rewards x High Teach. Qual.
School

2016 Comp. x Identity
(3)
2017 Comp.

-0.0053
(0.022)

Identity x 2016 Completion
High Teach. Qual. School
Identity

0.0052
(0.020)
0.026*
(0.016)
-0.033**
(0.016)

Social Rewards

0.054***
(0.016)
-0.0078
(0.015)

-0.0050
(0.016)
Completed in 2016
0.24***
0.24***
0.20***
(0.012)
(0.012)
(0.015)
Ineligible in 2016
0.20***
0.20***
(0.019)
(0.019)
Constant
0.44***
0.43***
0.76***
(0.013)
(0.013)
(0.055)
Observations
7616
7616
7130
0.056
0.056
0.340
𝑅2
N/A
N/A
Yes
School Fixed Eﬀects
Notes: This table shows the results from linear probability models evaluating the interactions between the
pooled treatments and two baseline characteristics: 1) specifications 1-2 interact each of the manipulations
with a 2015-2016 metric for high teacher quality at the school level (a dummy variable identifying schools
with an above-median percentage of teachers getting a "distinguished" rating); and 2) specification 3 interacts
the identity manipulation with whether or not a teacher completed the survey in the previous year, 2016, to
test for the presence of "consistency" as a motivation (note this regression omits teachers not employed by
SDP in 2016). Specification 3 includes school fixed eﬀects.
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not have individual-level measures of teacher quality. Also note that Table 4 also presents the results
for our secondary question of interest, regarding
the importance of “consistency” as a behavioral
motivation (measured using the interaction of past
survey completion with the identity manipulation).
We do find a fairly large positive interaction between the identity salience manipulation and
teacher quality at the school level: the coefficient
on the interaction is 5.0 percentage points (Table
5, column 1). However, note that the coefficient of
the identity salience manipulation (indicating the
impact of the identity salience manipulation in
schools with relatively lower teacher ratings) is -3.3
percentage points in this specification. Thus, the
identity salience manipulation has, on net, a small
positive effect in schools where teachers were
more highly-rated. We find no meaningful interaction between the social rewards treatment and
teacher quality at the school level, however (Table
5, column 2), or between the identity salience manipulation and prior-year survey completion (Table

5, column 3). We interpret these results as evidence
that our manipulations (and identity salience in particular) were relatively less efficacious in schools
where teachers received lower ratings on average,
though this is more suggestive than definitive.
To further explore the link between
school quality and the effectiveness of our manipulations, we present disaggregated treatment effects in Table 6. Specifically, in this analysis we disaggregate by a measure of school quality: namely,
which overall “tier” of school performance the
school had been placed in by the SDP. This tier
classification was based on publicly-available
“School Progress Report” metrics generated by the
city, and ranged from the lowest tier (‘intervene’)
to intermediate tiers (‘watch’ and ‘reinforce’) to the
highest tier (‘model’). This analysis serves as a “second test” of whether our manipulations varied in
efficacy based on school quality, broadly defined.
In this case, we do not observe much difference in
the estimates across schools of different quality,

Table 6
Disaggregated ATEs by school quality (SPR Tier)

Identity

(1)
Intervene
-0.00806
(0.0154)

Social
Rewards

(2)
Intervene

School Progress Report Category
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
Watch
Watch
Reinforce Reinforce
-0.00270
-0.00264
(0.0153)
(0.0244)

(7)
Model
0.0225
(0.0422)

(8)
Model

-0.00871

-0.00413

-0.00951

-0.0134

(0.0153)

(0.0153)

(0.0242)

(0.0413)

Completed in
2016

0.219***

0.219***

0.190

0.190***

0.248***

0.248***

0.0896**

0.0909*

(0.0181)

(0.0181)

(0.0187)

(0.0187)

(0.0301)

(0.0302)

(0.0449)

(0.0449)

Ineligible in
2016

0.189***

0.189***

0.153

0.153***

0.121***

0.121**

-0.0727

-0.0683

(0.0250)
0.727***
(0.0583)
3000
0.280

(0.0250)
0.727***
(0.0583)
3000
0.280

(0.0302)
0.946
(0.0255)
2977
0.338

(0.0302)
0.947***
(0.0256)
2977
0.338

(0.0518)
0.785***
(0.0370)
1220
0.331

(0.0516)
0.789***
(0.0356)
1220
0.332

(0.107)
0.768***
(0.0726)
361
0.273

(0.1080)
0.787***
(0.0752)
361
0.272

Constant

Observations
𝑅2
School Fixed
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Eﬀects
Notes: This table shows disaggregated average treatment eﬀects by school quality, using the 2015-2016 School
Progress Report score tier category (defined by the SDP). Linear probability model results are shown, with qualitatively-similar margin estimates from logit regressions presented in the Online Appendix. It does this for each of the
main eﬀects (identity and social rewards), for each of the four possible score categories, from the lowest-performing
schools ("Intervene") to the highest-performing schools ("Model"). All regressions include school fixed eﬀects and
dummy variables for survey completion and ineligibility for the survey (meaning not employed by the SDP) in the
previous year (the omitted group being teachers eligible but not completing in the previous year).
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except that the point estimate for the identity intervention at the best schools (‘model’ schools) is
roughly 2-3 percentage points greater than for
other schools. The difference is not statistically significant, however, due primarily to the relatively
small number of teachers who come from “model”
schools in the sample. However, this observation
does add some additional support to the idea that
school quality may positively impact the effectiveness of identity manipulations.

more efficacious as pay-for-performance schemes
with public sector employees (Ritz, et al., 2016,
Grant, 2008).
Second, the lack of overall effect of our
identity salience manipulation suggests that such
manipulations, as implemented here, may not be a
particularly promising approach for motivating aggregate teacher survey completion. Whether such
incentives would work better for outcomes that are
more obviously related to teaching (and thus to
teachers’ identities) remains to be seen. Furthermore, our exploratory results suggest that care
should be taken regarding which sub-populations
are targeted with such identity manipulations: the
identity manipulation may have modestly reduced
survey completion at schools where teachers receive lower ratings, while modestly increasing survey completion at schools with more highly rated
teachers.
In addition to these main conclusions regarding our experimental treatments, exploratory
analyses revealed interesting patterns regarding the
school-level and individual-level predictors of
teacher survey completion. First, teachers at
schools with more satisfied parents and students
were more likely to complete these surveys. Second, teachers at schools where students had fewer
behavioral issues (e.g. lower suspension rates and
higher attendance rates) were less likely to complete
these surveys. Third, teachers at schools where
teachers were rated highly were more likely to complete these surveys. One counterintuitive takeaway
from these findings is that one method to increase
rates of similar teacher feedback is to target schools
at which students are well-behaved. Assessing the
replicability of these relationships, and understanding their mechanisms, may be a fruitful direction
for future research.
One might argue that our lack of significant results is driven by the fact that teachers simply
did not read the emails they received carefully.
While we cannot be certain, we have reason to believe that this was not the case. In particular, the
SDP provided some anecdotal evidence that teachers were aware of the social/personal rewards, and
were both providing feedback about and asking for
more information about the timing of these rewards as the survey period came to a close. This
does not necessarily mean that they read and internalized the identity salience manipulation, but it
does suggest that teachers did not ignore the content of the email. Furthermore, to the extent that

Discussion
In this article, we report the results of a randomized
experiment testing the impact of social rewards and
an identity salience manipulation on encouraging
contributions to a public good: teachers completing
an annual survey. We have three main results. First,
we find that social incentives work just as well as
personal incentives at motivating teachers to be
prosocial. Second, we find no evidence that the
identity salience manipulation increased prosocial
behavior by teachers, nor did it meaningfully improve the efficacy of social rewards as an incentive
(relative to personal rewards). Third, exploratory
analyses indicated that survey completion happens
at a higher rate at schools where teachers are rated
more highly, and we found suggestive evidence that
our identity manipulation in particular may have
been somewhat more effective in these schools.
Our main conclusions, therefore, are as
follows. First, although social incentives were not
more effective than personal incentives (inconsistent with our hypothesis), the lack of difference
between conditions has both theoretical and practical importance. If teachers were purely self-interested (as sometimes assumed by policymakers),
then social incentives should have performed
worse than personal incentives. Thus, the lack of
difference between conditions implies that the
teachers had at least somewhat other-regarding
preferences. From a practical perspective, the lack
of difference in effectiveness between social and
personal incentives suggests that social incentives
may be preferable from the point of view of the
school district, as money spent by the district on
social incentives (buying school supplies for students) directly benefits students and does so without undermining teacher motivation. This result
speaks directly to a growing body of literature in
public administration suggesting that interventions
triggering prosocial motivations might be as or
11
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the identity manipulation seemed to have been negatively impactful at schools with lower-rated teachers and positively impactful at schools with highlyrated teachers, this suggests that teachers did read
the emails with sufficient care to notice the manipulation.
Another similar response to our results
might be that the manipulations were simply too
subtle to change behavior. While we are sympathetic to this view, we do not find it especially compelling. This intervention involved four separate
emails that reinforced the treatment messaging,
which is a reasonably strong manipulation when
compared to other manipulations of messaging in
the broader literature that uses behavioral interventions of this sort (Kessler & Milkman, 2016, Bursztyn & Jensen, 2015, Bryan et al., 2011, Shang et
al., 2008).
It is also plausible that teachers are already
quite strongly saturated in their “teacher identity”
when receiving the emails, meaning that an identity
salience manipulation could not influence behavior
very much. In other words, there may not have
been much “room” for the manipulation to
strengthen the influence of identity considerations
on decision making. Here again, the fact that we do
see variance in the efficacy of the identity manipulation as a function of school quality provides some
evidence that this explanation is not fully satisfying.
In particular, our finding that the identity salience
manipulation did positively influence survey completion at schools with highly rated teachers (where
teachers may identify more strongly with a teacher
identity) somewhat weakens the case for alreadyhigh salience of identity across the board being the
reason for the small aggregate effect.
Furthermore, one might argue that our
null results on social versus personal rewards are
influenced by the fact that teachers often use personal money to pay for school supplies for their
students anyway, making our “social rewards”
more similar to our “personal rewards” than they
could have been. To the extent that this is an issue,
future work might test a more unambiguous form
of social reward, like a donation in the teacher’s
name to a school-specific scholarship or charitable
fund, instead of a gift card for school supplies.
There are important limitations of our
findings. First, we were unable to include a control
group that received no incentive at all, both because
of SDP priorities and because of concerns about

spillover effects if we had a control group not receiving incentives. As a result, we cannot say how
much the incentives increased survey completion,
but can only conclude that social rewards were
roughly as effective as personal ones. Though this
particular context may not be ideal for an experiment on incentives with a pure control group, future work in this area would do well to have a pure
control group to measure the causal impact of incentives in general, perhaps through variations in
when teachers are informed about the lottery incentives (before vs. after they complete the survey, for
example).
Second, we were not able to observe which
teachers actually read the email soliciting survey
completion (and thus who were actually influenced
by the treatment). It may be that the treatments
would appear substantially more effective if we
were able to focus on those who were actually
treated.
Third, in terms of how our results inform
the broader literature on cooperation and public
goods, our outcome (survey completion) may not
ideal. Although it is true that survey completion is
a public good, many of the teachers may not have
actually perceived the survey as creating benefits
for others. This could be due to skepticism about
the effectiveness of the school bureaucracy or a
perception of red tape (Dehart-Davis & Pandey,
2005; Pandey & Scott, 2002). Thus, their prosocial
motivations may not have been engaged in the task.
If this was indeed the case, our manipulations may
have been more effective for outcomes that were
more obviously prosocial.
Finally, we cannot rule out the possibility
that some treatments might have improved the
“quality” of the sample (i.e., the representativeness
of teachers responding) or of the survey responses
(i.e., the detail and thoughtfulness of the feedback)
without affecting the completion rate. However,
while we have no way of testing the latter possibility
with our data, we believe the former is not especially likely given that we find few meaningful differences in school-level characteristics across treatments.
In sum, we found little impact of social
versus personal incentives and of identity salience
on teacher survey completion. Our results suggest
that school districts, and public sector organizations more broadly, should further investigate the
use of social incentives, as such incentives are often
12
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preferable so long as they do not undermine motivation. The limited aggregate impact of the identity
manipulation, on the other hand, contributes to a
growing literature that goes beyond just identifying
promising nudges to testing when those nudges actually work, and for whom they work more or less
effectively.

3. https://www.philasd.org/performance/programsservices/open-data/
4. Note that the regression in column 2 includes
teacher-level control variables for: 1) completing the survey in 2016; and 2) not being eligible
to complete the survey in 2016. These two
dummies allow us to control for the threevalue categorical variable capturing teacher behavior in 2016 survey completion (ineligible to
complete, completed, or did not complete
when eligible). This differs from the treatment
of teacher-level variables in column 1, which
includes single variable regressions for: 1) the
ineligible dummy variable; and 2) a binary variable for whether or not a teacher completed
the survey conditional on being eligible (a regression that excludes ineligible individuals).
We did the analysis in column 1 in this way to
make the coefficient for 2016 survey completion easier to meaningfully interpret.
5. Because the inferences drawn from any individual regression method presented in Columns 1-3 of Table 4 may suffer from bias or
constitute spurious correlation, we include all
three to triangulate our understanding of which
school-level variables are most strongly associated with teacher survey completion. We suggest that more confidence can be put in this relationship when a variable is a significant predictor across multiple regression specifications.
To that end, Table 4 presents the school-level
variables in descending order of the apparent
strength of relationship with teacher survey
completion.
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Notes
1. Note that the initial randomization consisted
of 8,423 teachers, but we removed 361 teachers
from the analysis who were not (for various
reasons) active SDP teachers as of May 31st,
2017. This was done based on advice from the
SDP and does not affect the results, since these
individuals were by and large not employed by
the SDP when the surveys were distributed.
2. Note that the sample for this intervention did
not include charter school teachers, though
they also were invited to complete the annual
survey.
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Appendix
Figure A1: Treatment email screenshots (for first emails, sent on April 4, 2017; screenshots
of three follow-up reminder emails visible in online appendix, Figures 2-5)

(a) “Standard” condition

(b) “Social Rewards Only” condition
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(c) “Identity Only” condition

(d) “Social Reward + Identity” condition
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